Philosophy is shaped by life and life is shaped by philosophy. This is reflected in The Philosophical I, a collection of 16 autobiographical essays by prominent philosophers.

We may paraphrase Charles Péguy by noting that the philosophical classics are new every morning and nothing is as old as today’s latest philosophical fad. Even fads are not without their value, however, if some new approach or method is introduced and shown to be really contributory to “progress in clarification” in either historical understanding or in the pursuit of new knowledge. In any case, the great enduring philosophical views present a continual challenge to be updated in the light (...) of new knowledge. We know much more now about individuals, classes, relations, predication, identity, and the like, than was known in the days of Peirce and Bradley. It may be helpful to examine the views of these writers on these topics, especially as concerns continuous relations, in the light of what we now know. The result will be not only an updating but to some extent a defense and rational reconstruction of some views which have long been in disrepute among writers who pride themselves upon logical clarity. (shrink)

Over the course of three decades, in works spanning questions of theory, technique, and clinical practice, Charles Brenner has emerged as one of the preeminent analysts of his generation, a thinker whose probing estimation of mental conflict has promoted the evolutionary growth of analysis as theory even as it has clarified the clinical import of analysis as therapy. In _Psychoanalysis: The Science of Mental Conflict_, distinguished theorists and clinicians pay homage to Brenner by presenting original essays that converge in (...) their estimation of analysis as "the science of mental conflict." In sections that encompass "The Theory of Psychoanalysis," "The Concepts of Psychoanalysis," "The Technique of Psychoanalysis," "The Clinical Practice of Psychoanalysis," "The Teaching of Psychoanalysis," and "The Application of Psychanalysis," the contributors show how the perspective of conflict - broadened and refined by the clinical findings of recent decades - offers a vehicle for creative theory-building and, as such, a conceptual handle for apprising the indications for, and action of, psychoanalytic therapy. Arnold Richards' comprehensive overview of Brenner's ranging contributions to theory and practice, along with Martin Willick's critical introductions to the various sections of the book, round out a collections whose scope is complimented by its unusual coherence and thematic unity. Taken together, the essays comprising this book present readers with a cogent summary of current psychoanalytic thinking, along with an exciting preview of where it is heading in the future. As such, this volume will be welcomed not only by analysts, but by all mental health professionals who draw on, and learn from, the psychoanalytic assessment of conflict in mental life. It is a work that follows Brenner's own example in promoting the critical understanding of a generation of theorists, clinicians, and educators. (shrink)

1 Evidence-based policy requires researchers to provide the answers to ecological questions that are of interest to policy makers. To find out what those questions are in the UK, representatives from 28 organizations involved in policy, together with scientists from 10 academic institutions, were asked to generate a list of questions from their organizations. 2 During a 2-day workshop the initial list of 1003 questions generated from consulting at least 654 policy makers and academics was used as a basis for (...) generating a short list of 100 questions of significant policy relevance. Short-listing was decided on the basis of the preferences of the representatives from the policy-led organizations. 3 The areas covered included most major issues of environmental concern in the UK, including agriculture, marine fisheries, climate change, ecosystem function and land management. 4 The most striking outcome was the preference for general questions rather than narrow ones. The reason is that policy is driven by broad issues rather than specific ones. In contrast, scientists are frequently best equipped to answer specific questions. This means that it may be necessary to extract the underpinning specific question before researchers can proceed. 5 Synthesis and applications. Greater communication between policy makers and scientists is required in order to ensure that applied ecologists are dealing with issues in a way that can feed into policy. It is particularly important that applied ecologists emphasize the generic value of their work wherever possible. (shrink)

"....an admirably clear account of Heidegger's relation to the philosophical tradition, and especially of his criticism of Cartesianism." -- Richard Rorty, University of Virginia.

In a paper presented at a symposium on structuralism at the Johns Hopkins University in 1968, the historian Charles Morazé analyzed the issue of invention largely with reference to mathematics and the theory of Henri Poincare.1 Poincare, along with the physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz, was the first to put forward a theory of scientific discovery as occurring in discrete phases. In 1926, Joseph Wallas generalized this theory to apply to all creativity, positing phrases which closely resemble those of Morazé. (...) While both Poincare and Wallas use a four-phrase model of invention, Morazé reduces his to three phrases: information, cogitation, and intellection. In information, the inventor becomes familiar with the sign systems and knowledge, the "collective contributions of society," relevant to his field of problems. Cogitation assembles these materials and concentrates them until "a certain moment" when "a light breaks through." This "sudden illumination...forces us to insist upon the neurological character" of the inventive moment. Finally, in intellection, the inventor rationally evaluates the utility of his invention and thus, in a sense, steps outside of himself and rejoins society. The distinction which organizes Morazé 's entire account, as well as most of the discussion that followed his presentation, is between the "collective" support and control of the inventor and his own individual, or "neurological," act of synthesis or creation. · 1. See Charles Morazé 's "Literary Invention," in The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, pp. 22-55. Loy D. Martin is an assistant professor of English at the University of Chicago. He has written The Language of Invention, a study of Robert Browning and the genesis of the dramatic monologue. "A Reply to Carl Pletsch and Richard Schiff" appeared in the Spring 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Return of Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to BayleSébastien CharlesGianni Paganini, editor. The Return of Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003. Pp. xxviii + 486. Cloth, $180.00.Cette édition des actes du congrès international « The Return of Scepticism », organisé par Gianni Paganini à l'Université du Piémont-Oriental de Vercelli en mai 2000, a pour ambition de faire le point sur l'état de la (...) recherche actuelle en cherchant à cerner au mieux les implications épistémologiques et les répercussions européennes du scepticisme à la période moderne. Placés sous le patronage de Richard H. Popkin, dont un essai ouvre l'ouvrage et pave la voie à de futures recherches sur la question, les textes rassemblés par Gianni Paganini ont pour trait commun d'insister sur la prégnance du scepticisme à l'époque moderne, tout en prenant garde au fait de bien replacer chaque stratégie sceptique dans l'environnement culturel et philosophique qui fut le sien. Divisé en sept sections, l'ouvrage fournit une vue d'ensemble de la question sceptique qui s'étale sur deux siècles, le XVIIe et le XVIIIe.Dans la première section, l'accent est mis sur un aspect délaissé de l'histoire du scepticisme moderne, à savoir le traitement particulier qui lui fut réservé dans la pensée anglaise des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Sont abordés ici les cas de Hobbes, dont le traitement du scepticisme est pensé en relation inversée avec celui de Descartes (G. Paganini), Locke, qui tend à faire sien le principe sceptique de la limitation du savoir (G. A. J. Rogers), et les Platoniciens de Cambridge, qui s'inspirent de la méthode sceptique pour compartimenter le champ du savoir (F. Tomasoni).Dans la deuxième section, c'est la pensée continentale qui est à l'honneur, avec des textes consacrés à Descartes spécifiquement ou à La Mothe le Vayer et Descartes, avec pour objectif commun de questionner l'originalité du travail cartésien en insistant notamment sur le rôle de l'epoché chez Charron comme source possible du cogito (J. R. Maia Neto) et sur une tradition sceptique non fidéiste présente dans les œuvres de La Mothe le Vayer comme de Descartes (J.-P. Cavaillé).La troisième section évoque la prise de conscience des enjeux sceptiques chez les sectateurs et les adversaires de Descartes, qui s'accordent tous à reconnaître l'insuffisance de la réfutation du scepticisme proposée par ce dernier. Ce point fait l'unanimité tant chez les opposants à Descartes—Martin Schoock (A. Del Prete), Pierre Villemandy (C. Borghero), Pierre-Daniel Huet (T. M. Lennon), et les philosophes italiens Fardella et Doria (M. T. Marcialis)—que chez ceux qui se sont inspirés de sa philosophie—Arnauld (G. Belgioioso), Malebranche, Foucher et Desgabets (E. Scribano).La prise en compte des enjeux sceptiques aux plans politique et religieux est intégrée dans la quatrième partie au sein de laquelle sont évoquées des thématiques plurielles comme la présence du probabilisme néo-académique chez Pascal (A. McKenna), l'interprétation sceptique, voire libertine, du pouvoir et de la liberté rattachée à la théorie hobbesienne de l'état de nature chez Samuel Sorbière (L. Bianchi), ou le rapport existant entre scepticisme et tolérance (L. Simonutti).La section suivante délaisse politique et religion pour aborder le cas de la science, et de l'effet du scepticisme au niveau épistémologique. Le cas de Martín Martínez témoigne du fait que le scepticisme peut être conciliable avec une vision empiriste de la science et qu'une physique sceptique reste possible (J. C. Laursen). De même, le rapport des savants italiens comme Redi, Magalotti ou Dati à l'égard du scepticisme est évocateur de la prise de conscience des dangers que le scepticisme pose pour le domaine du démontrable (M. Torrini), ce qui vaut également pour toute théorie de la signification, dont les implications sceptiques sont patentes (G. Hassler), ou pour toute approche historique minée par des considérations pyrrhoniennes (C. Grell... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"INTRINSICALLY EVIL ACTS" AND THE MORAL VIEWPOINT: CLARIFYING A CENTRAL TEACHING OF VER/TATIS SPLENDOR 1 MARTIN RHONHEIMER Roman Athenaeum of the Holy Cross Rome, Italy 1. Introduction: Distinguishing choices and their objects from further intention:s and consequences MANY CATHOLIC moral theologians have asserted during the last few years that to know what a person really does each time he or she is acting and, consequently, to qualify morally (...) this concrete doing, one must take into account all the further goals for the sake of which this person chooses what he concretely does. Equally, so these theologians contend, a balance of all foreseen consequences should be established to make out whether a determinate behavior is the right or the wrong thing to choose. Therefore, according to this view it will always be impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its speciesits "object "-the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or specific ads, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned (VS 79). The encyclical Veritatis Splendor rejects this view of so-called " teleological " ethical theories 2 as incompatible with the exist1 I thank Prof. John M. Haas of Philadelphia for having carefully reviewed my English version of this paper, originally written in German (and not yet published). 2 The term "teleological " as a characterization of ethical theories became successful through C. D. Broad's essay, " Some of the Main Problems of Ethics," Philosophy XXI (1946), reprinted in C. D. Broad, Broad's Critical 1 2 MARTIN RHONHEIMER ence of describable concrete actions which are " intrinsically evil," that is, which are evil " always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances " (VS 80). Consequently, this view finally is judged as incompatible with the Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. D. R. Cheney (London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1971), pp. 223-246. Broad simply identified any "teleological" argumentation with a consequentialist one. So he says (p. 230 of the reprinted essays) : " One characteristic which tends to make an act right is that it will produce at least as good consequences as an alternative open to the agent in the circumstances (... ) We can sum this up by saying that the property of being optimific is a very important right-tending characteristic. I call it teleological because it refers to the goodness of the ends or consequences which the act brings about." Broad, then, goes on to say that a " nonteleological " characteristic of an action would be, for example, the obligation, independent from considering consequences, to perform what one has promised. But already in 1930 Broad had distinguished "teleological" from "deontological " ethical theories; see C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), pp. 206 ff. Many, today, call non-teleological ethics (in Broad's sense) "deontological "; cf. William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963). The term "teleological ethics" was thus " imported " by German moral theologians, mainly by Bruno Schuller; see his Die Begrundung sittlicher Urteile. Typen ethischer Argumentation in der Moraltheologie, 2nd ed. (Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1980), pp. 282-298 (first published in 1973). According to Schuller, a normative ethic would be "teleological " if it affirms that " the moral character of all the actions and the omissions of man is exclusively determined by its consequences" (282). So he uses "teleological ethics" as synonymous with "consequentialism" (a term in fact created by G. E. M. Anscombe) and even with " utilitarianism." Its counterpart would be " deontological ethics," which holds that there are some actions the moral rightness of which should not be judged exclusively on the basis of their consequences; see also Bruno Schiiller, "Various Types of Grounding for Ethical Norms," in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), pp. 184-198. However, as it seems to me, these distinctions are not very clarifying; they rather seem to confuse judgments of prudence ("such and such is the right thing to... (shrink)

In his new introduction, "Note on a Missing Text," Richard Wolin uses the absence from this edition of an interview with Jacques Derrida as a springboard for ...

Of course in every act of this kind, there remains the possibility of putting this act into question – insofar as it refers to more distant, more essential ends.... For example the sentence which I write is the meaning of the letters I trace, but the whole work I wish to produce is the meaning of the sentence. And this work is a possibility in connection with which I can feel anguish; it is truly my possibility...tomorrow in relation to it (...) my freedom can exercise its nihilating power. (shrink)

Three eminent scientists analyze the scientific, social, and political roots of biological determinism.

The situated potentials for action between material things in the world and the interactional processes thereby afforded need to be seen as not only constituting the possibility of agency, but thereby also comprising it. Eo ipso, agency must be de-fused from any local, "contained" subject and be understood as a situational property in which subjects and objects can both participate. Any technological artifact should thus be understood as a complex of agential capacities that function relative to any number of social (...) and material factors. Keeping in mind that we are co-constituted by webs of relations involving increasingly complex collections of artefacts, networks, niches, and communities of practice, our investigation will be guided by interrogating the functional potential of a thing that in the last fifteen years has seamlessly worked its way into the everyday life of millions of human agents. This "thing," the smartphone, is merely a nodal point in a highly complex network. Recognizing this massive "collective," we nevertheless want to show some of the ways in which something as seemingly mundane as a smartphone can reflexively alter the range of actions available to a cognitive agent (Latour 1994). Specifically, we hope to shed light on some of the social-cognitive consequences of technological mediation by looking at the complementary, if not mutually implied, domains of memory and knowledge. (shrink)

(1998). Consensus, neutrality and compromise. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 1, Pluralsim and Liberal Neutrality, pp. 54-78. doi: 10.1080/13698239808403248.

Michel Foucault (1926-84) was one of the most renowned of late 20th century social philosophers. He covered an enormous range: from sexuality to prisons; from identity to power; from knowledge to politics. The essays written for this book range over all of Foucault's work, but their main critical focus is upon objectivity, power and knowledge. The very possibility of a critical stance is a recurring theme in all of Foucault's works, and the contributors vary in the ways that they relate (...) to his key views on truth and reason in relation to power and government. (shrink)

This collection of papers derives from a conference on the reception of Aristotle in the Middle Ages held at the University of Alberta in September, 1990, and organized by the editors. They conceived of the conference in the light of a general view of Aristotle and medieval thought, a statement of which may serve as an introduction to the papers which follow.Within the Greek philosophical tradition Aristotle's works became the focus of commentary and discussion; they became, furthermore, the texts of (...) instruction, particularly in logic. Some scholars, of a Neo-Platonist orientation, sought to harmonize the teachings of Plato and Aristotle and to deliver those teachings as a single science or body of knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Autonomy versus Control The Psychology of Autonomy Questions Concerning Autonomy The Theory and Practice of Externally Controlled Learning The Theory and Practice of Autonomous Learning Classroom Management.

Este repertorio registra información de Husserl en la Internet, una breve historia sobre los Nachlaß, el índice de la Husserliana, un listado de las publicaciones de y sobre Husserl disponibles en la Biblioteca Central de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, y los artículos sobre Husserl que se encuentran en la Hemeroteca. El listado abarca las publicaciones existentes hasta el año 1997.

This book applies Augustine's thought to current questions of teaching and learning. The essays are written in an accessible style and is not intended just for experts on Augustine or church history.

More than a decade after Philip P. Wiener and Frederick H. Young edited the first volume of Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Moore and Robin have brought together a collection of essays which serves as a valuable supplement to that earlier publication. It is more than a supplement, however; it can stand on its own as a significant contribution to Peirce scholarship. Continuity with the first volume is achieved through new essays which analyze Peirce's theory of (...) belief, of habit, and of Scotistic realism—themes about which many of the earlier papers revolved. Novelty is achieved through increased emphasis on Peirce's logical and mathematical writings and on the influence of nineteenth century evolutionism upon Peirce's pragmaticism. The exploration of the latter motif in the three contributions of W. Donald Oliver, Rulon Wells, and Thomas A. Goudge is particularly noteworthy. In their Preface, Moore and Robin state that the most significant contribution of this new volume is the revelation of the extent to which Peirce was first a scientist and then a philosopher. This is a misleading characterization of the book. True, Victor F. Lenzen's "Charles S. Peirce As Astronomer" is an engaging piece. On the other hand, the bulk of the articles impress the reader with the originality and modernity of Peirce, the philosopher and Peirce, the logician. The most notable feature of this collection is the number of essays which draw parallels between dominant philosophical and logical themes found in Peirce's writings and major interests of mid-twentieth century philosophers. Impressive examples are: A. R. Turquette's "Peirce's Icons For Deductive Logic," Richard M. Martin's "On Acting On A Belief," Larry Holmes's "Prolegomena To Peirce's Philosophy Of Mind," and Richard J. Bernstein's "Peirce's Theory of Perception." In presenting the articles which constitute this volume the editors give evidence not only of the relevance of Peirce for the contemporary student of philosophy but also of the impetus which Peirce's thought has provided for creative philosophical analysis. An additional bonus for Peirce scholars are two bibliographies prepared by Max H. Fisch. One is a supplement to Arthur W. Burk's 1958 bibliography of works by C. S. Peirce. The other is a draft of a bibliography of works about C. S. Peirce.—B. G. R. (shrink)

"Clifford was famous for his public lectures on physics and math and ethics because he explained complex things with easily understood, concrete examples. As you read through his clear, simple explanations of the true bases of number, algebra and geometry you will find yourself getting angry and saying "Why the hell wasn't I taught math this way?" and "Do math ed professors know so little mathematics that they have never heard of Clifford.?" Clifford was destined to be England's Einstein until (...) his untimely death at the age of 34, just 11 days before Einstein's birth. More than 30 years before the Special Theory of Relativity was proposed he had already concluded that the force of gravity was actually due to changes in the curvature of space. He gives explanatory examples in this book that middle school children can understand."--review on Amazon.com viewed July 6, 2020. (shrink)

Through engaging interviews, testimonials, and anecdotes from photographers, curators, printers, and colleagues, Object Lesson: On the Influence of Richard Benson pays homage to a legendary figure whose name is synonymous with the evolving history and philosophy of photographic reproduction. From making platinum prints for Paul Strand and books with Lee Friedlander to his own experiments with inkjet and digital offset processes, and as a teacher and dean of the Yale School of Art, by the time of his death in (...) 2017, Benson had inspired over three decades of students and artisans through his mentorship and work. In words and images, Object Lesson stands as a testament to Benson's wit, wisdom, and incomparable obsession with how photographic images render and connect us to the world. (shrink)

According to both traditional positivist approaches and also to the sociology of scientific knowledge, social analysts should not themselves become involved in the controversies they are investigating. But the experiences of the authors in studying contemporary scientific controversies—specifically, over the Australian Animal Health Laboratory, fluoridation, and vitamin C and cancer—show that analysts, whatever their intentions, cannot avoid being drawn into the fray. The field of controversy studies needs to address the implications of this process for both theory and practice.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Three Odes HORACE (Translated by Charles Martin) To Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa No fears, Agrippa: your exploits will be Saluted by a bard who will eclipse Homer in singing your command of ships, Your winning use of cavalry. It won’t be us. Gifts far surpassing mine Are to be found in Varius, who sings Achilles’ spleen, Ulysses’ wanderings At sea, or Pelops’ nasty line. Of loftiness, we (...) have a deficit, And so our Muse forbids us to pursue Praising your glory and our Caesar’s too, Lest, overwrought, we lessen it. Varius is fit to sing of Mars arrayed In armor, of Meriones in dust, Or of those gods that Diomedes thrust His lance through, with Athena’s aid. Ours, the wine bar and the local fray, The bachelorettes whose nails leave livid traces We later notice on their boyfriends’ faces And lightly sing of, in our way. (Odes i.6) arion 28.3 winter 2021 74 threee odes To Leuconoe Stop seeking what the gods prohibit us from apprehending, Leuconoe—the date on which it all comes to an ending. Better to toss the Dream Book and accept whatever comes, Whether Jove sends more winters, or the last we’ll know now drums The Tuscan Sea into submission on opposing cliffs. Be wise—decant this evening’s wine, curtail your hopeful ifs: Live in the moment: as we speak, now is becoming then; And insofar as possible, ignore tomorrow’s, “When….” (Odes i.11) To Iccius Iccius, are you hot for Arabian Loot now, devising tactics to subjugate The previously undefeated Kings of Sabaea? Forging new fetters For the ferocious Medes while previsioning Your oriental sex-slave, unguarded by The boyfriend whom you’ve slain in battle? What perfumed page from some royal palace, Whose father taught him Sinoform archery, Will be your Ganymede? Oh, deny falling Rivers the right to scale steep mountains, Tell us the Tiber can’t flow back upstream, When you—who were once so very promising, Rush to exchange your Works of Panaetius AND those Platonic scrolls you scoured bookstalls in search of—for Spanish armor! (Odes i.29)... (shrink)

These new essays on J. L. Austin's philosophy constitute the first major study of his thought in decades.